































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(𝑥1,	𝑥2,	…,	𝑥!)	>>	(𝑦1,	𝑦2,	…,	𝑦!)	if	∑ 𝑥!!"#$ 	>	𝑚	+	∑ 𝑦!!"#$ 	
Informally:	a	value	is	higher	if	its	sum	is	greater	by	a	certain	margin.26	
	
Where	this	says	that	one	value	can	be	higher	than	another,	despite	losing	along	one	
dimension,	if	it	wins	by	a	sufficient	amount	along	all	dimensions	combined.	
The	result	is	a	Paretian	view	on	which	the	numbers	count	when	they	aren’t	close.	
This	is	Taurek	Lite—his	view	minus	one	bit	that	makes	it	extreme.27	I	expect	that	many	
 
24	Contrast	this	with	the	beverages:	if	I	slightly	improved	the	coffee	along	a	bunch	of	
different	dimensions,	eventually	the	improved	coffee	could	well	be	better	than	the	tea	
overall,	even	if	it	remains	worse	in	terms	of	freshness.	
25	Put	formally,	Taurek’s	dimensions	of	value	form	a	LIBERUM	VETO	OLIGARCHY:	if	A	is	
better	than	B	along	all	dimensions,	A	is	better	overall,	and	if	A	is	better	along	any	
dimension,	then	A	is	at	least	as	good	as	B	overall.	No	dimension’s	dissent	can	ever	be	
overruled.	The	formal	concept	of	an	oligarchy	comes	from	Gibbard	(2014),	who	notes	
that	the	PARETO	EXTENSION	leads	to	an	oligarchy	of	all,	and	explores	connections	between	
oligarchies,	Arrow’s	Impossibility	Theorem	(Arrow	1951),	and	varieties	of	transitivity.	
26	This	principle—though	very	crude,	with	its	single	fixed	margin—has	more	expressive	
power	than	Friedman’s	(2009:	282–83)	formalism,	which	only	allows	us	to	compare	
one	respect	in	which	A	is	good	to	one	respect	in	which	B	is	good.		
27 Anscombe	(1967),	in	an	important	precursor	to	Taurek’s	paper,	takes	another	kind	of	
moderate	anti-counting	position.	She	denies	that	you	must	save	five	strangers	rather	
	 23	
philosophers	will	be	more	open	to	this	kind	of	view	than	Taurek’s	own.	Then	again,	the	
things	that	make	Taurek’s	original	view	unpopular	also	make	it	singularly	fascinating,	
especially	to	the	formal	ethicist.	
In	this	paper,	I	have	tried	not	to	take	sides,	but	only	to	understand	Taurek	
rigorously—on	his	own	terms.	If	Taurek’s	real	concern	is	the	nonfungible	value	of	
human	life,	his	nontransitivity	might	be	a	feature,	not	a	bug,	and	the	extreme	parts	of	his	
view	might	be	the	icing,	not	the	cake.28	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
 
than	one,	but	she	allows	that	it	would	be	intelligible	to	save	the	many	for	the	reason	that	
they	are	more.	For	another	moderate	view,	see	Setiya	2014.	
28	My	thanks	to	the	editors	of	Ergo	and	several	anonymous	referees	for	speedy	and	
insightful	comments;	this	was	truly	one	of	the	best	experiences	I	have	ever	had	with	an	
academic	journal.	For	discussion	directly	about	the	paper,	I	thank	Brian	Hedden,	Zach	
Barnett,	Theron	Pummer,	Toby	Handfield,	Peter	Graham,	and	Kerah	Gordon-Solmon.	
Thanks	also	to	Kieran	Setiya,	who	sparked	my	interest	in	Taurek,	and	special	thanks	to	
Tyler	Doggett,	whom	I	‘know	and	like’,	for	encouragement,	inspiration,	and—best	of	
all—detailed	written	comments.	
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